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Abstract 
This study aims to understand if there is a relationship between company’s corporate tax 
avoidance and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The sample comprises 4,453 firm-
year observations from 914 US-listed companies in the NYSE and NASDAQ, between 
2002 and 2016.  Overall, we do not find a statistical support for an association between 
corporate tax avoidance and corporate social responsibility. However, corporate tax 
avoidance appears to be positively associated with CSR for firms engaged in higher levels 
of corporate corporate social responsibility, which is consistent with risk management 
theory (Godfrey et al. 2009, Larrinaga et al., 2008). Our results provide a different insight 
to the literature, suggesting that firms that have more socially responsible activities tend 
to be also more tax avoidant because it helps in mitigating the risk of possibly being 
audited and having regulatory sanctions, as well as bad reputation from bad press and 
public scrutiny.  
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Resumo 
Esta tese visa entender se existe uma conexão entre planeamento fiscal corporativo e 
responsabilidade social corporativa (RSC). Utilizamos uma amostra composta por 4.453 
observações de 914 firmas americanas na NYSE e NASDAQ, entre 2002 e 2016. No 
geral, não encontramos evidências estatísticas de uma associação entre planeamento 
fiscal corporativa e responsabilidade social corporativa. No entanto, através de uma 
regressão por quantis, encontramos evidências estatísticas de uma relação entre 
planeamento fiscal corporativo e RSC em níveis mais altos de RSC, consistente com a 
teoria da gestão de risco (Godfrey et al. 2009, Larrinaga et al., 2008). Os nossos resultados 
fornecem uma visão diferente da literatura, sugerindo que as empresas que usam mais 
planeamento fiscal para reduzir o valor a pagar em impostos concentram-se em praticar 
mais atividades de RSC para mitigar o risco de possivelmente serem auditadas e com 
sanções regulatórias, bem como má reputação proveniente da imprensa e do escrutínio do 
público. 
 
Palavras-chave: Planeamento fiscal corporativo; Responsabilidade Social Corporativa 
  
 
  iii 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank my advisor Professor Victor Barros for all the support provided, for 
all the wisdom he shared, for always being available to answer any doubts I had, and for 
all the motivation and guidance he transmitted throughout this journey. 
I would also like to thank my friends for sharing this experience and making it 
worthwhile. And my mother, Maria de Lurdes, my father, Paulo, and my sister Íris for 
always being there and taking care of me. 
Finally, I am truly thankful to my girlfriend, Inês Costa, for all the guidance, motivation 
and support given throughout the completion of the thesis. All the night calls, with 




  iv 
 
Índice 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... I 
RESUMO ................................................................................................................................................ II 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................... III 
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ................................................................ 3 
2.1 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY .................................................................................................... 3 
2.2 CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE ............................................................................................................. 4 
2.3 CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE AND CSR ................................................................................................ 5 
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 7 
3.1 DATA ............................................................................................................................................. 7 
3.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT ........................................................................................... 8 
3.2.1 Dependent variable ................................................................................................................ 8 
3.2.2 Independent variable .............................................................................................................. 9 
3.2.3 Control variables ................................................................................................................... 10 
3.3 BASE REGRESSION MODEL ................................................................................................................ 12 
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .................................................................................................................. 12 
3.5 CORRELATIONS RESULTS .................................................................................................................. 13 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 15 
4.1 REGRESSION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 15 
4.2 QUANTILE REGRESSION ................................................................................................................... 15 
5 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 19 
6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 20 
 
1 Introduction 
Corporate tax avoidance has been a target of substantial scrutiny in previous research 
throughout the years, and so has corporate social responsibility. Yet, studies focusing on 
the relationship between the two are fairly scarce. With a crescent presence of tax 
avoidance in firms, especially US companies1, as well as a tendency for more socially 
responsible activities2, it is unexpected that literature linking them is effectively lacking. 
Following suggestions for deeper investigation associating tax avoidance with CSR 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), recent studies have been emerging in an attempt to relate 
them (e.g. Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Hoi et al., 2013; Watson, 2015) and, in our 
research, we aim to add clarification to that link. 
Corporate social responsibility, as Sikka (2010) states, “is broader than simple 
compliance with law”. It has to incorporate the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary 
expectations of society in the corporations’ decisions, prioritizing the needs of 
stakeholders over the interests of shareholders3. Socially responsible companies practice 
voluntary activities that contribute to community health (e.g. breast cancer initiatives), 
safety (e.g. crime prevention), education (e.g. literacy), employment (e.g. formations at 
work), environment (e.g. recycling), among others (hunger, animal rights) (Kotler and 
Lee, 2005). 
Tax avoidance represents firms’ set of tax planning strategies to reduce their explicit 
taxes, ranging from municipal bond investments (the less aggressive form of tax planning) 
to sheltering or even tax evasion (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Dyreng et al., 2008). The 
most frequently used measures to capture tax avoidance are effective tax rates, GAAP 
ETR and Cash ETR, and the latter is used in our empirical analysis. Most managers 
perceive corporate taxes as mere firm operating costs, and the focus of their firm 
businesses to be long-term profits. Therefore, their objective is to reduce those costs in 
order to maximize shareholders’ value, disregarding other stakeholders’ interests 
(Friedman, 1970; Sikka, 2010).  
                                                          
1 See Murphy (2011) for a study putting the United States as the country with the highest loss to tax 
evasion, with an estimated loss of US$337 billion. 
2 See Min-Dong and Lee (200 8) 
3 see Carroll (2015) 
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The benefits brought to a firm from reducing tax payments may implicate external costs. 
The State finances public goods (education, health, national defense, public transport, and 
law enforcement) through the tax revenue collected from individuals and corporations. 
When companies engage in tax avoidance, there is a loss of that tax revenue, limiting that 
possibility of the State in providing support to public goods (Sikka, 2010, Freedman, 
2003). For this reason, the practice of tax avoidance is viewed as a socially irresponsible 
activity, possibly leading to negative public and media scrutiny.As consequence, tax 
avoidance can jeopardize company’s reputation and damage their brand’s value. 
However, companies may strategically engage in socially responsible activities as a 
management of risk, in order to increase their reputation (Godfrey et al. 2009, Larrinaga 
et al., 2008). This increase in a corporation’s CSR reputation “provides some degree of 
insurance protection against the risk of market, political, regulatory and social sanctions 
when negative corporate events occur.” (Hoi et al., 2013).  
Previous research suggests there may be an association between CSR and tax avoidance. 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) find that there is a negative association between CSR 
disclosures and tax aggressiveness. The more a company is socially responsible, the less 
likely it is tax aggressive. With a different approach, Hoi et al. (2013) show that only 
irresponsible CSR activities are significantly and positively related to tax avoidance. 
However, Preuss (2010) and Sikka (2010) state that socially responsible firms (or the ones 
who claim to be socially responsible) also practice tax avoidance activities. In this study 
we examine the relationship between CSR and tax avoidance, and specifically whether 
firms exhibiting higher levels of CSR engage in more tax avoidance.  
We use financial data from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database consisting of 4,453 firm-
year observations from 914 firms in the NYSE and NASDAQ, between 2002 and 2016. 
For the data on CSR, we use Thomson Reuters Datastream’s ESG Combined Scores. 
Consistent with Hoi et al. (2013), our results do not indicate a direct association between 
CSR and tax avoidance. We find there is a positive between high-level tax avoidance 
firms and CSR, consistent with the risk management theory. More tax avoidant 
companies tend to focus on increasing their socially responsible activities to protect 
against public and press scrutiny, as well as political and regulatory sanctions. We also 
examine the link between low-level tax avoidance and CSR, and do not find a relevant 
association. The remainder of the research is structured as follows: Section 2 presents 
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previous literature and development of our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology of the study. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a term difficult to define, but it is a practice that 
is gaining major importance in companies over the years. This importance is emphasized 
by the fact that, by the end of the 90’s, almost 90% of Fortune 500 firms had their CSR 
activities promoted in their annual reports as opposed to less than half of Fortune 500 
firms mentioning anything related to CSR in 1977 (see Min-Dong & Lee, 2008).  
Kotler & Lee (2005) define CSR as a voluntary “commitment to improve community 
well-being through discretionary business practices and contributions of corporate 
resources”. The authors point that these practices can be monetary and nonmonetary and 
contribute to community health (e.g. breast cancer initiatives), safety (e.g. crime 
prevention), education (e.g. literacy), employment (e.g. formations at work), environment 
(e.g. recycling), among others (hunger, animal rights). CSR is also defined by Business 
for Social Responsibility as “operating a business in a manner that meets or exceeds the 
ethical, legal, commercial, and public expectations that society has of business” (see 
Kotler & Lee, 2005). 
Business for Social Responsibility (nonprofit global organization that deals with topics 
related to Social Responsibility) emphasizes, supported by their research, that Corporate 
Social Responsibility can bring many benefits to Companies, such as reduction of 
operating costs, increased attractiveness to investors, increased market share, among 
others (see Kotler & Lee, 2005; Carroll, 2015). Also, Jones (1995) states that altruistic 
behaviors that are “trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative, not opportunistic, will give the 
firm a competitive advantage”, and potentially decreases the “risks of becoming the target 
of lawsuits” (Min-Dong & Lee, 2008). Therefore, CSR is now considered as more than 
just a moral responsibility of firms to provide social benefits, as managers also use it 
strategically to serve and improve the bottom line performance of the firms (Kotler & 
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Lee, 2005; McWilliams, Siegel & Wright, 2006; Min-Dong & Lee, 2008).  
 
2.2 Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Tax avoidance is yet again a term that brings a lot of discussion over its meaning, as there 
is no uniquely recognized definition. Some researchers state tax avoidance is legal tax 
planning whereas tax evasion is illegal tax planning (see Weisbach (2003)), while others 
prefer not to exploit the legality of tax avoidance, stating it “represents a continuum of 
tax planning strategies” used to decrease explicit taxes, where, at one end of the 
continuum (the less aggressive type of tax planning) we have, for example, "municipal 
bond investments", and at the other end of the continuum we have "noncompliance", 
"aggressiveness", "sheltering" and "evasion" (see Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010, Dyreng et 
al. 2008). We will follow the latter definition. 
The complexity of its definition has lead researchers to use many different measures of 
tax avoidance. Out of the 12 measures Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) review, GAAP ETR 
(ratio of total income tax expense over pretax income) and Cash ETR (ratio of cash tax 
paid over pretax income) are the most used by literature. We will use Cash ETR as our 
tax avoidance measure. 
For a notion of the behavior of European quoted companies regarding tax avoidance, Tax 
Justice Network made a survey in 2009 and “estimated that 99% of the European quoted 
companies have operations in tax havens, which levy low taxes and offer secrecy to 
enable corporations to avoid taxes in other jurisdictions” (see Sikka, 2010). Additionally, 
a study made by Murphy (2011) puts the United States as the country with the highest 
loss of tax evasion, with an estimated loss of US$337 billion. 
Although corporate tax avoidance can be perceived as beneficial for the shareholders and 
the company, it entails costs. Risk-neutral shareholders’ belief that executives will act in 
their behalf to focus on profit maximization can potentially lead to tax decisions that act 
in the private interests of opportunistic executives (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006, Hanlon 
& Heitzman, 2010). If shareholders become aware of these actions, they will “price 
protect themselves and bid the firm price down” (Chen et al., 2010). Another consequence 
of tax avoidance is the possibility of being audited by the tax administration in the US 
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(IRS), getting caught and subsequently receive punitive actions. This eventually leads to 
other consequences, such as bad reputation, weakening of the brand, loss of clients, as 
evidenced by the analysis of Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) of a negative (-1,04%) stock price 
reaction to news of a firm’s involvement in tax shelters. 
 
2.3 Corporate tax avoidance and CSR 
Corporations have to take into account the potential concerns of both society in general 
and shareholders. On one hand, society’s issue is to see if the company pays its taxes; on 
the other hand, shareholder’s issue is to see if the company is really avoiding taxes to 
maximize shareholder value (Huseynov and Klamm, 2012). The fact that avoiding taxes 
leads to a loss of tax revenue for the state, limiting the capacity to provide support to 
education, health, national defense, public transport and law enforcement (Lanis & 
Richardson, 2010), suggests that tax avoidance companies are socially irresponsible. 
However, these companies can adopt other socially responsible measures as a risk 
management strategy to increase CSR reputation, thus diminishing “expected costs 
associated with aggressive tax practices” (Hoi et al., 2013). If this is the case, there would 
be a positive relationship between CSR and CETR. Sikka (2010) exploits some case 
studies of companies who claim to be socially responsible and engage in tax evasion. 
Huseynov & Klamm (2012) examine the effect of CSR on tax avoidance for S&P500 
firms that use auditor-provided tax services. To measure CSR, the authors use three 
variables from the KLD STATS database — corporate governance, community, and 
diversity. To measure tax avoidance they use both GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) and 
Cash ETR. Huseynov & Klamm (2012) conclude that CSR levels influence the 
relationship between fees paid for auditor-provided tax services and tax avoidance. 
Specifically, they find a link between tax fees and lower cash effective tax rates when a 
firm has corporate governance strengths4 or diversity concerns5, and between tax fees and 
higher Cash ETR’s in a firm with any community concerns.  
                                                          
4 Socially responsible behaviors. 
5 Socially irresponsible behaviors. 
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Lanis & Richardson (2012) find that there is a negative association between CSR 
disclosures and tax aggressiveness. Their sample consists of a cross-section of 408 
publicly listed Australian corporations, and data was collected from the Aspect-Huntley 
financial database for the 2008/2009 financial year. Tax aggressiveness is measured based 
on ETRs. The authors find that higher the level of CSR disclosure of a corporation are 
associated with lower levels of corporate tax aggressiveness. Also, Lanis & Richardson 
(2012) extended the base regression model by grouping the CSR activity items by 6 
different categories: corporate and CSR strategy items, staffing strategy items, social 
investment items, environment items, customer and supplier items, and community and 
political. They conclude that firm’s social investment commitment, and corporate and 
CSR strategy are statistically significant items of CSR activities, and that they cause a 
negative effect on tax aggressiveness. 
Hoi et al. (2013) use a large sample of U.S. public firms over the period 2003-2009 and 
conclude firms with more irresponsible CSR activities, especially firms with excessive 
irresponsible CSR activities (four or more). In their study, CSR was obtained using 
negative social ratings from KLD database. The authors find no association between 
responsible CSR activities and tax avoidance. The authors adopt a wider perspective to 
measure CSR activities. These are corporate actions affecting all the firm’s stakeholders 
including shareholders, employees, communities, government, and customers. 
Irresponsible CSR activities are those that harm the firm’s stakeholders.  
Literature suggests that the main reason for the lack of research providing an association 
between tax avoidance and CSR is the fact that corporate taxes are mostly perceived as a 
“business transaction and one of the many costs of operating a corporation” (Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012), thus managers’ objective is to maximize shareholders’ value, through 
the avoidance of taxes, disregarding other corporation’s stakeholders needs (Friedman, 
1970; Sikka, 2010; Hoi et al., 2013). However, as previously mentioned, avoiding taxes 
negatively impacts the general society, as the state will have fewer funds to finance the 
various public goods (e.g. education, health, national defense). Therefore, it is regarded 
as a socially irresponsible measure when a firm “engages in strategic tax behavior 
designed solely to minimize its corporate taxes” (see Lanis and Richardson, 2012).  
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As CSR is regarded as having a positive impact in the well-being of most of the firms’ 
stakeholders, and tax avoidance strategies are perceived as exerting a negative impact in 
society in general, the first research hypothesis is as follows:  
H1: Corporate social responsibility is negatively associated with corporate tax avoidance. 
In this case CSR is our dependent variable whereas corporate tax avoidance is our variable 
of interest. This type of association is different from the literature, as CSR is normally the 
independent variable. 
Despite the fact that corporate tax avoidance is perceived to have a negative impact to the 
general public, tax avoidant companies may strategically engage in socially responsible 
activities as a management of risk strategy, in order to increase their reputation. In fact, 
the literature suggests that there is a link between CSR and Risk Management (e.g. 
Godfrey et al., 2009). As Hoi et al. (2013) points, the increase in a corporation’s CSR 
reputation “provides some degree of insurance protection against the risk of market, 
political, regulatory and social sanctions when negative corporate events occur.” 
Therefore, the risk management theory suggests that corporations engage in strategic tax 
planning to reduce corporate taxes may focus in also adopting more socially responsible 
activities to increase their reputation and protect against the potential adjacent 
consequences of avoiding taxes (Godfrey et al., 2009, Hoi et al. 2013). Based on this 
rationale, we expect companies that are engaged in higher levels of CSR activities will 
exhibit higher levels of corporate tax avoidance. The second research hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H2: Corporate social responsibility is positively associated with corporate tax avoidance 
for firms that have higher levels of corporate social responsibility. 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our sample consists of 4,453 firm-year observations from 914 firms in the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, between 2002 and 2016. Our sampling period is limited by the non-existing 
CSR data and scores of the Thomson Reuters Datastream’s ESG Combined Scores prior 
to 2002. These are the firms with the required information from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
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Database (for financial accounting data) and from Thomson Reuters Datastream’s ESG 
Combined Scores (for CSR data), after excluding the financial firms from the initial 
sample (following prior research on tax avoidance). 
3.2 Variable definition and measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
We use Thomson Reuters Datastream's ESG combined scores to measure companies' 
CSR performance. Thomson Reuters ESG Combined Score is an overall company score 
between 0 and 100 based on the reported information in the environmental, social and 
corporate governance pillars (ESG Score) with an ESG Controversies overlay. It is 
calculated as the weighted average of the two component scores, with recent controversies 
being reflected in the latest complete period.  
ESG category Score measures company’s ESG performance based on company reported 
data in the public domain (corporate website, annual reports, ESG reports, bylaws, code 
of conduct, etc.) across ten categories: resource use, emissions and innovation 
(Environment); workforce, human rights, community and product responsibility (Social); 
management, shareholders and CSR strategy (Governance). 
ESG controversies category score measures a company's exposure to environmental, 
social and governance controversies and negative events reflected in global media. It is 
calculated based on 23 ESG controversy topics. During the year, if a scandal occurs, the 
company involved is penalized and this affects their overall ESGC scores and grading. 
Controversy scores are fully automated and objective. It is calculated an aggregated 
controversy percentile rank across E, S, and G, using all 23 controversy measures.  
A detailed description can be seen in table 1. 
We are aware of the limitations present in this CSR measure. KLD database is a much 
more recognized and the most frequently used score to measure corporate social 
responsibility activities by the literature, that brings different elements to the estimation 
of CSR, for example, distinct scores to individual activities, scores for irresponsible 
activities and their description for each company. 
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Table 1: CSR scores description 
The Thomson Reuters ESG Scores were designed to transparently and objectively measure company’s 
relative ESG performance across ten themes (emissions, environmental product innovation, human rights, 
shareholders, etc.) based on company reported data. There are two overall ESG Scores calculated per 
company, per fiscal year in the model: 
1. Thomson Reuters ESG Score – measures company’s ESG performance based on company reported data 
in the public domain (corporate website, annual reports, ESG reports, bylaws, code of conduct, etc.) across 
ten categories as described below. 
2. Thomson Reuters ESG Controversy (ESGC) Score – overlays the Thomson Reuters ESG Score with 
ESG controversies to provide a comprehensive evaluation on the company’s sustainability impact and 
conduct. The ESG Combined Scores are calculated as the weighted average of the two component scores 
per fiscal period, with recent controversies being reflected in the latest complete period.  
Pillar Category Indicators in rating Weights 
Environmental Resource use 20 11% 
 Emissions 22 12% 
 Innovations 19 11% 
 
   
Social Workforce 29 16% 
 Human Rights 8 4,5% 
 Community 14 8% 
Product Responsibility 12 7%     
Governance Management 34 19% 
 Shareholders 12 7% 






3.2.2 Independent variable 
Following prior research (Lanis & Richardson 2012; Hoi et al. 2013), we use cash 
effective tax rate (CETR) to capture the consequences of broad tax avoidance practices. 
CETR is the ratio of cash tax paid over pretax income for firm i in year t (Dyreng et al. 
2010). Therefore, the lower the Cash effective tax rate, the higher the level of corporate 
tax avoidance. 
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We are aware of the limitations of this measure. CETR only captures non-conforming tax 
avoidance.6 As Cash ETR uses cash taxes paid as the numerator, it “is affected by tax 
deferral strategies but is not affected by changes in the tax accounting” (Hanlon and 
Hetizman, 2010). Also, this measure can be misleading, as cash taxes paid may include 
taxes paid or returned to or from the IRS, for example, from earnings from a different 
period.7  
Despite these limitations, Cash ETR is one of the most recognized and used measure in 
literature to capture corporate tax avoidance, and it is the measure we will follow.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We include various control variables to control for firm characteristics found to impact a 
firm’s ETR. These are return on assets (ROA), market-book-ratio (MKTBKR), size of 
the firm (SIZE), plant, property, and equipment (PPE) leverage (LEV), intangible assets 
(INTANGIBLES), inventory intensity (INVENTORY).  
ROA is a measure of firm’s profitability equal to pre-tax income scaled by total assets, 
MKTBKR is a growth variable equal to the market value of equity scaled by the book 
value of equity, and SIZE (natural logarithm of total assets) is used to control for firm 
size effects. These variables are included in our regression model following Dyreng et al. 
(2008) findings that small and high-growth firms have higher ETRs.8  
As Capital intensive firms may have more tax planning opportunities, and therefore, 
lower ETRs, we include the variable PPE (measured as plant, property, and equipment 
scaled by total assets) to control for this effect.9 Gupta & Newberry (1997) also find 
leverage to be positively associated with tax avoidance. LEV is long-term debt scaled by 
total assets. 
                                                          
6 Conforming tax avoidance is when a firm is able to reduce its explicit taxes by both reporting lower 
accounting earnings and lower taxable income. 
7 This limitation is pointed by Dyreng et al. (2008), and the authors’ alternative to the annual Cash ETR is 
a 10-year Cash ETR (Long-Run Cash ETR). Their findings suggest the annual Cash ETR is not a good 
predictor of the long-run behavior of firms regarding tax avoidance. 
8 Other studies find no association between size and ETR (for example Gupta and Newberry, 1997) or 
find a negative association between size and ETR (for example Lanis and Richardson, 2007). 
9 See Lietz (2013) 
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Following Hoi et al., 2013 and Chen et al., 2008, we also include INTANGIBLES 
(measured as Goodwill scaled by total assets) in our empirical analysis to control for our 
tax avoidance measure. INVINT (inventory scaled by total assets) is also included, 
following Lanis and Richardson (2012). Lastly, we include dummies to control for year 
and industry fixed effects. Table 2 describes the variables definition of our regression. 
 
Table 2: Variables definition 
Measure of Tax Avoidance: 
 
CETR Cash effective tax rate Ratio of cash tax paid over pretax 
income for the firm. CETR is 
truncated between 0 and 1.  
Measure of CSR: 
  
CSR Environment, Social and 
Governance combined score 
Overall company score between 
0 and 100 based on the reported 
information in the 
environmental, social and 
corporate governance pillars 
(ESG Score) with an ESG 
Controversies overlay. It is 
calculated as the weighted 
average of the two component 
scores, with recent controversies 
being reflected in the latest 
complete period.  
Control Variables: 
  
PPE Capital intensity (-) Plant, property and equipment 
divided by total assets 
LEVERAGE Leverage (-) Long-term debt divided by total 
assets 
INTANGIBLES Intangibles (?) Goodwill divided by total assets 
ROA Return on assets (?) Net income divided by total 
assets 
SIZE Firm size (?) Natural log of total assets 
MKTBKR Market-to-book ratio (?) The market value of equity 
divided by the book value of 
equity 
INVENTORY Inventory intensity (+) Inventory divided by total assets 
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3.3 Base regression model 
We test our relation between CSR and tax avoidance, with the following base regression 
model:  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐵𝐾𝑅𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
+   𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a corporation’s cash effective tax rate, measured as the ratio of cash tax 
paid over pretax income for firm i in year t; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the Return on assets for firm i, year 
t measured as the pre-tax income scaled by total assets; 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐵𝐾𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the market value 
of equity scaled by the book value of equity for firm i, year t; SIZEit is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; PPEit is property, plant and equipment for firm i, year t, scaled 
by total assets; LEVit is the leverage for firm i, year t, measured as long-term debt scaled 
by total assets; INTANGit is the goodwill for firm i, year t, scaled by total assets; INVINTit 
is inventory for firm i, year t, scaled by total assets. We also tested for headquarter 
dummies, but the impact in our regression model was residual, and industry provides a 
better fit to the model. 
Our second hypothesis relates to the left tail of the CSR distribution (i.e. more CSR 
activities engaged by a firm), our statistical test and inference is based on a quantile 
regression estimate. 
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables present in our regression. For CETR, 
the mean (median) is 0.2782 (.2590). CETR varies from 0 to 0.9326 (with a range of 0-
1), and its standard deviation is 0.1864. For CSR, the mean (median) is 44.9510 (42.3400)  
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with a range of 0-100, meaning that on average firms have a CSR score of around 45. For 
the control variables, we have that PPE has a mean (median) of .2492 (.1861), 
LEVERAGE has a mean (median) of .2166 (.2062), INTANGIBLES has a mean 
(median) of .1755 (.1462), ROA has a mean (median) of .0764 (.0683), SIZE has a mean 
(median) of 22.6708 (22.5747), MKTBKR has a mean (median) of 3.6821 (2.7949), and 
INVENTORY has a mean (median) of .1156 (.0907). 
 
3.5 Correlations results 
In Table 4 it is represented the Pearson pairwise correlation results. This correlation 
matrix shows CETR is negative and significantly correlated with CSR (correlation -
0.0555; p-value 0.0002), indicating that the higher the firms’ score of CSR, the lower its 
cash ETR (more aggressive towards tax avoidance). For CETR, we also have that 
INTANGIBLES and INVENTORY are positive and significantly correlated, while ROA 


























         
CETR 4453 .2782 .1864 0 .9326 .1637 .2590 .3438 
 
CSR 4453 44.951 15.2720 0 95.9 34.4 42.34 53.86 
 
PPE 4453 .2492 .2047 0 1 .0999 .1861 .3413 
 
Leverage 4453 .2166 .1459 0 1 .1160 .2062 .3084 
 
Intangibles 4453 .1755 .1393 0 .6316 .0587 .1462 .2684 
         
ROA 4453 .0764 .0556 -.350878 .4925 .0340 .0683 .1026 
         
Size 4453 22.6708 1.3838 17.2733 27.4051 21.7694 22.5747 23.6095 
         
Mktbkr 4453 3.6821 22.7930 -
477.0976 
856.4461 1.7664 2.7949 4.2801 
         
Inventory 4453 .1156 .1094 0 .7916 .0351 .0907 .1578 
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We also tested for the multicollinearity by conducting a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
test. If a variable has a VIF value above 10, it can be an indication of multicollinearity. 
With a mean VIF of 1.92 and no variable having a VIF value near 10, we don’t find 
evidence of multicollinearity in our regression.  
To test for the normality of the variables, we conducted a battery of tests to check the 
normality of the residuals. First, we generated the residuals of our regression and viewed 
the Kernel density estimation and the standardized normal probability (P-P), and we 
concluded that the residuals are non-normal. Finally, we conducted the Shapiro-Francia 
test, as it has less than 5000 observations. We ended up with the same conclusion, the 
residuals are non-normal. Therefore, our predictions may be inaccurate. However, as we 
don’t have a variance issue, we can disregard the fact that we violate the assumption of 
normality. 
Additionally, we did a Wald test to check if the variables present in our regression can be 
removed from our model and not reducing its fit. We made the test by using the test 
command in stata, and checking if the parameters of our variables were simultaneously 
equal to zero. As the p-value equaled zero, we rejected the null hypothesis, indicating that 
every variable creates a significant improvement in the fit of our model.  




Variable   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
CETR [1] 1         
CSR [2] -0.0555* 1        
PPE [3] -0.0055 -0.0125 1       
Leverage [4] 0.0136 0.0597*  0.1687* 1      
Intangibles [5]  0.0482* -0.0175 -0.3797* 0.1392* 1     
ROA [6] -0.1571* 0.0267 -0.0750* -0.2787* -0.1353* 1    
Size [7] -0.0487* 0.2171* 0.1070* 0.1636* 0.0484* -0.1477* 1   
MKTBKR [8] 0.0064 0.0257 0.0002 0.0033 -0.014 0.0279 0.0008 1  
Inventory [9] 0.1141* -0.1165* -0.0756* -0.1755* -0.2322* 0.0956* -0.2815* 0.0049 1 
This table presents the Pearson Correlation univariate analysis.   
* Significance at the .05 level. 
 
  15 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Regression results 
We test the influence of CETR on CSR using our regression model. Table 5 reports these 
results. We find the regression coefficient for CSR is negative, contrary to H1, but it is 
not statistically significant.  Therefore, we do not find statistical evidence that an increase 
in tax avoidance leads to a decrease in the company’s CSR score. 
Looking at the effect control variables have on tax avoidance, we find ROA is positive 
and very significantly related with CSR, as well as SIZE (p<.01). These associations 
suggest that bigger companies engage in more CSR activities. Leverage is also positive 
and significantly related with CSR. PPE is negative and significantly related with CSR. 
Capital-intensive firms are expected to have higher tax planning opportunities, and this 
can lead to irresponsible CSR activities, decreasing the CSR score of a company. We also 
find Intangibles and Inventory to be negative and very significantly associated with CSR 
(p<.01).  
 
4.2 Quantile Regression 
Quantile regression allows us to confirm if there is a link between corporate tax avoidance 
and CSR at higher levels of CSR, our second hypothesis.  Quantile regression enables us 
& Tukey (1977, p. 266), while exploiting and comparing these different methods observe: 
“What the regression curve does is give a grand summary for the averages of the 
distributions corresponding to the set of x’s. We could go further and compute several 
different regression curves corresponding to the various percentage points of the 
distributions and thus get a more complete picture of the set. Ordinarily, this is not done, 
and so regression often gives a rather incomplete picture. Just as the mean gives an to get 
a more concrete inference, at different distributions of tax avoidance, which we otherwise 
would not obtain from an ordinary least square (OLS) regression.10  Mosteller incomplete 
                                                          
10 OLS regressions only describe the relationship between independent variables and the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable of interest. Quantile regressions describe the relationship between the 
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picture of a single distribution, so the regression curve gives a corresponding incomplete 
picture for a set of distributions.”  
 
        Table 5: OLS Regression results (H1) 
 (1) 
 CSR 
CETR  -1.860 
 (1.237) 




















Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
                                                          
independent variables and any specified percentile of the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable. For a more profound analysis of quantile regressions, see Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
 
  17 
 
Table 6 presents the results of our quantile regression at high levels of CSR. Our Quantile 
regression estimates at the 75th percentile of the CSR distribution. In this scenario, we 
find a very negative and significant association between CSR and CETR at high levels of 
CSR. Therefore, there is statistical evidence that at higher levels of Corporate social 
responsibility activities, as a corporation’s level of tax avoidance increases, its CSR also 
increases. Corporations that are more tax aggressive may tend to adopt more socially 
responsible measures to try to offset their tax aggressive policies.   
For the control variables, the quantile regression shows a negative and significant 
association between PPE, and high-level CSR, a negative and significant association 
between INVENTORY and high-level CSR, a negative and significant association 
between INTANGIBLES and high-level CSR. The opposite significant association 
happens with ROA, SIZE and LEVERAGE. Only Market-to-book Ratio doesn’t have a 
significant association with CSR.  
We also analyze the regression at lower levels of CSR (25th percentile). As we expected, 
there is no association between CSR and Tax avoidance, at lower levels of CSR. 
To get a more detailed vision of the association between CSR and corporate tax avoidance 
at different distributions of corporate social responsibility scores, we measured the deciles 
of CSR, as shown in table 7. The results show that the negative association between CSR 
and corporate tax avoidance is only significant between the 50th and the 80th percentile. 
Perhaps companies that are fully committed in engaging in CSR activities (90th percentile) 
prefer not to evade taxes or are at that level because they don’t engage in any kind of 
irresponsible activity (corporate tax avoidance may impact the measure of CSR as it is 
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Table 6: Quantile Regression results (H2) 
 (1) (2) 




CETR  -4.245** -1.611 
 (2.016) (0.999) 
PPE proportion -5.937*** -1.243 
 (2.270) (1.117) 
Leverage 7.716*** 0.673 
 (2.898) (1.464) 
Intangibles -9.008*** -4.231*** 
 (3.180) (1.606) 
ROA 19.673*** 8.248** 
 (6.007) (3.688) 
Size 3.349*** 2.497*** 
 (0.302) (0.135) 
Mktbkr 0.004 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.011) 
Inventory  -16.110*** -8.240*** 
 (4.201) (2.174) 
Observations 4453 4453 
Adjusted R2   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 7: Quantile Regression results (H2) 




















CETR 0.561 -1.501 -1.500 -1.536 -2.180** -2.634** -3.609** -3.211* -2.252 
 (0.915) (0.995) (0.939) (0.953) (1.110) (1.216) (1.438) (1.770) (2.104) 
PPE -0.708 -1.006 -1.075 -1.224 -1.767 -3.563* -4.811*** -5.875*** -7.309*** 
 (0.646) (1.225) (1.163) (1.239) (1.441) (2.010) (1.786) (1.922) (1.758) 
Leverage -0.477 0.527 1.735 3.188* 4.312** 5.646** 6.093** 6.968*** 3.127 
 (1.584) (1.616) (1.442) (1.804) (1.889) (2.499) (2.414) (2.456) (1.943) 
Intangibles -5.708*** -4.045** -2.865* -3.455* -3.797* -4.761** -6.478** -13.344*** -17.537*** 
 (1.549) (1.826) (1.704) (1.811) (2.056) (2.335) (2.539) (2.960) (2.436) 
ROA 16.708*** 12.984*** 13.440*** 13.424*** 13.739*** 18.998*** 20.752*** 22.485*** 25.919*** 
 (3.918) (2.733) (3.980) (4.455) (4.596) (6.100) (5.188) (6.476) (5.452) 
 
  19 
 
Size 3.277
*** 2.739*** 2.306*** 1.901*** 1.877*** 2.085*** 2.645*** 3.934*** 4.498*** 
 (0.156) (0.145) (0.143) (0.154) (0.172) (0.224) (0.261) (0.295) (0.289) 
mktbkr 0.012 -0.000 -0.000 0.013 0.016** 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.028*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
Inventory -11.723
*** -6.985** -8.777*** -8.651*** -12.046*** -11.943*** -16.702*** -15.450*** -24.961*** 
 (1.724) (2.751) (2.582) (2.533) (2.173) (3.310) (3.528) (4.135) (3.265) 
Observatio
ns 
4453 4453 4453 4453 4453 4453 4453 4453 4453 
Adjusted R2          
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5 Conclusions 
Following previous and important empirical contributions of Lanis & Richardson (2012),  
Huseynov & Klamm (2012), Hoi et al. (2013) and Watson (2015), this study examines the 
association between CSR and tax avoidance. Using cash ETR to measure tax avoidance and 
a sample consisting of 4,453 firm-year observations from 914 US firms in the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, between 2002 and 2016, our regression results indicate there is not a direct 
association between CSR and the practice of tax avoidance. However, through quantile 
regression estimation, focusing on the association between corporate tax avoidance and 
CSR at higher levels of CSR, we find a positive link between them. 
Our results provide a different insight to the literature, suggesting that, consistent with 
risk management theory, firms that engage in more CSR activities may tend to engage in 
corporate tax avoidance, as they are aware that practicing more alternative CSR activities 
helps in mitigating the risk of possibly being audited and having regulatory sanctions, as 
well as bad reputation from bad press and public scrutiny. An alternative future research, 
that we did not test, is whether this association is stronger with bigger and/or more 
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